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2Introduction.
An early experiment with an exchange-rate band was implemented in the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy between 1896 and 1914. This remarkable episode is relevant for modern research, because
it was explicitly designed along principles spelled out more recently in modern “target zone theory”
(TZT) (Krugman, 1991). The Austro-Hungarian exchange-rate band operated smoothly for almost
two decades, in stark contrast to many recent unsuccessful experiences with such target bands,
which tended to collapse in infamous speculative attacks. The bank received lot of praise for its
innovative policy. For example, the Governor of the Austro-Hungarian central bank, Leon Bilinski,
found the bank’s policy “original”, “excellent”, an “innovation” that had enhanced its reputation
greatly (Federn, 1911, p. 1388). Contemporary observers rationalized the system in strikingly
modern terms: they emphasized that exchange rate depreciation within the band triggered stabilizing
expectations that minimized the need for aggressive interest rate increases (Federn, 1910, p. 662;
1911, 1391; 1912). This notion is reminiscent of Svensson’s (1992, 1994) emphasis that currency
bands work by reconciling policy autonomy with exchange rate stability.
Thus, the Austro-Hungarian target zone operated in practice just like target zones are supposed
to operate in theory. This fact makes it a quite useful natural experiment that has the potential to
tell us a lot about a prominent theory. To this end, the paper is organized as follows. Section I
provides the historical background. Section II gives an original derivation of the basic target zone
model as a set of nested hypotheses. Empirical tests using New data from primary sources are
performed in Section III. They explain the key reasons for the success of the Austro-Hungarian
experiment: foreign exchange market efficiency and policy credibility. Section IV, finally, shows that
covered interest parity is a much less essential ingredient to the TZT than conventionally thought.
The conclusion emphasizes the importance of the historical lesson for both theory and policy.
3Section I. A success story
Svensson credits Keynes for a pioneering statement of modern target zone theory. Keynes
argued that the degree of short-term policy autonomy increased with the distance within the “gold
points” (as the gold standard exchange rate band was known): “The degree of separation between
the gold points is a vital factor in the problem of managing a country’s currency […] [Widening the
band] would permit temporarily the maintenance of materially different short money rates in the
two centers” (Keynes, 1930). As Einzig (1937, p. 332-3) recognized, Keynes’ insight had its roots
in the pre-war policy of the Austro-Hungarian Central Bank, which “closely resembles Mr.
Keynes’s proposal for the widening of the margin between gold points”.1
These policies emerged in 1896 to reconcile conflicting goals. Monetary authorities had wanted
to achieve exchange rate stabilization in terms of a new gold parity, but they were also concerned
with retaining part of the protection from external shocks that was thought to have existed behind
the “Chinese wall” of a flexible exchange rate (Lotz, 1889). In particular, they wanted to smooth out
variations of the interest rate. They thought that brutal interest hikes, imposed by monetary policy
abroad, would have adverse real effects of the economy (Knapp, 1905, p. 250; von Mises, 1909b).
An additional concern arose from politics. Austria-Hungary was in effect a monetary union and
discount rate changes were a potential source of political conflict between the Austrian and
Hungarian parts of the monarchy (Flandreau 2005). Therefore, their occurrence was to be
minimized.
                                                
1 To what extent was Keynes directly inspired by the Austro-Hungarian precedent? No explicit reference to the Austro-
Hungarian case has been found in Keynes, who discusses instead the French experiment with “gold devices”. Yet, the
Austrian discussions on this issue had reached the British public very early on, through von Mises’s publication in the
Economic Journal (1909a), an article with which Keynes would no doubt have been familiar given his position at the
Journal. Finally, Keynes was an admirer of Knapp’s Theorie des Geldes, of which a large part was devoted to describing
and praising Austro-Hungarian policies (Hodgson, 2001).
4The solution found was to stabilize the currency against the German mark within an informal
band. The policy was implemented gradually. Until 1889, the Austro-Hungarian currency was
essentially a free float (Yeager, 1969). From the Summer of 1889 until 1892, a debate developed
about the relative merits of fixed vs. flexible exchange rates. In 1892, the supporters of stabilization
won and a new gold parity was set close to the current exchange rate. Though the new parity was
soon leaked to the market, the law adopting it was not formally ratified by both the Austrian and
Hungarian parliaments until the following year (Flandreau and Komlos, 2002). Moreover, no
practical steps were taken for effective stabilization. Exchange rate movements resumed despite
occasional foreign exchange market interventions. The delay resulted from internal conflict between
Austria and Hungary, unable to agree on the design of the Bank’s charter in the event of currency
stabilization. The reason was fostering the credibility of the Bank meant increasing monetary
dominance at the expenses of the respective governments of Austria and Hungary.
In March 1896, however, the adoption of an informal target zone policy, apparently decided
unilaterally by monetary authorities, ushered in an era of exchange rate stability. In 1899 the Bank’s
Charter was finally agreed upon. Coinage of a new currency began in 1900. In August 1901 the Bank
announced that it would normally trade gold coins against its banknotes. By the end of the following
year, the withdrawal of government banknotes from circulation – which had begun after 1894 – was
completed. At the same date, the so-called “Ischl agreement” decided that the central bank would
become the sole repository of the foreign exchange balances that the two governments accumulated
to service their external debts (governments dealt previously with international banks). As a result,
the central bank became a key player in the foreign exchange market (Kövér and Pogány 2002).
According to contemporary analysts, this set of decisions opened the “heyday” of an Austro-
Hungarian currency band (von Mises, 1909a, p. 203). It would last about 13 years, until WW I.
5The size of the band was understood by market participants through informal contacts between
bank officials and the financial community to be of about [–0.4%,+0.4%] around parity,
corresponding to the cost of shipping gold between Vienna and Berlin or London (von Mises,
1909a; Einzig, 1937). It appears that the bank had an intuitive understanding of the dangers of one-
sided bets and avoided specifying explicit bands that would have committed authorities to throw
their entire reserves in an exchange rate battle, should a confidence crises arise (Federn 1909). The
informal band was defended through discretionary foreign exchange intervention when the exchange
rate approached its informal boundaries. The minutes of the board meetings of the Austro-Hungarian
Bank do suggest that there was no formal red line: authorities could occasionally retreat before
marching again: the effective band is probably best described as a [-0.5;0.5] interval.2
Figure 1 about here.
According to observers, this arrangement enabled monetary authorities to adjust monetary policy
to domestic conditions. When, for instance, interest rates increased in Berlin, monetary authorities in
Vienna were able to let the exchange rate go as a substitute for competitive interest rate hikes. The
way contemporaries understood this to work was strikingly modern: exchange rate depreciation,
they argued, triggers stabilizing expectations of eventual exchange rate recovery, because agents
understand that the exchange rate will remain within the band. For instance, Federn (1909) argued
that the exchange rate depreciation that would follow the decision to keep interest rates low should
be “small, because the excess demand for foreign exchange [in Vienna] disappears by itself, insofar
as the small expected increase in benefits to be gained through interest rate arbitrage is compensated
                                                
2 Specifying it this way only leaves out six observations for the period 1901-1914 (monthly data). There was a debate
on the exact form of foreign exchange interventions. Von Mises insisted that all interventions were on the spot market.
Federn, followed by Einzig, claimed that these were complemented by forward interventions. However, our perusal of
board minutes during the critical episode of 1907 did not find references to forward interventions (Austrian National
Bank Archive, “Protokollen”, October 24, 1907; November 9, 1907; November 28, 1907).
6by the risks of losses due to [the threat of a future recovery] in the exchange rate.”3 Similarly Einzig
(1937, p. 332-3) explained that “to discourage the outflow of funds, the Austro-Hungarian Bank at
times allowed the [florin] to depreciate […] Since the stability of the [florin] was above suspicion
[…] few people cared to run the risk of losses through its probable recovery, simply for the sake of
an arbitrage profit which, for a period of three months, was never much over 1/2 per cent.”
Table 1 about here
Evidence of the success of the Bank’s policy includes the fact that official discount rate changes
in Vienna were only marginally less frequent before the currency was stabilized than when it was
pegged within a narrow band  (Table 1). Contemporaries thus concluded that the exchange rate
stability after 1896 had not been secured at the expense of monetary policy autonomy (von Mises,
1909b p. 1010). Another popular piece of evidence was the bank’s performance during the 1907
international financial crisis (Einzig 1937).
The 1907 crisis originated in the US and soon spread to major European financial centers. In
Berlin, the Reichsbank raised its rate from 5.5 to 6.5 percent on November 1 and then again from 6.5
to 7.5 percent on November 11. Yet the currency band shielded Vienna, contemporaries argued, and
indeed, the examination of the evidence confirms this view (Figure 2). Figure 2 is based on daily data
from primary sources, and shows the spot and forward rates against the mark along with official
bank rates in Vienna and Berlin. It is evident that the Austro-Hungarian monetary authorities were
able to tolerate a widening spread against German rates: it reached 250 basis points in the middle of
November before stabilizing at 150 basis points. Contemporary analysts rationalized this by
pointing to the fascinating behavior of the spot and forward rates. Until early November, when the
                                                
3 Walther Federn (unsigned), Die Zeit, 23 August 1907, reiterated in numerous editorials in Der oesterreichische
Volkswirt, i.e., July 17, 1909. For a complete list of dates see Einzig (1937, p. 335) and Federn, (1910b, p. 666). In
the 1910 article Federn referred explicitly to the need to cover exchange-rate risk by selling forward marks.
7Austro-Hungarian currency was “strong” (i.e. below parity) forward marks traded at a premium
(above spot rate): market participants expected an eventual depreciation of the florin. When crisis
hit, authorities let the exchange go: as a result the exchange rate became “weak” (above parity) but
forward marks traded at a discount (below spot rate): market participants now expected an eventual
appreciation of the currency. Observers surmised that by letting the exchange rate go above parity,
monetary authorities had induced speculators to play the florin up. In summary, there was
stabilizing speculation inside the currency band (Federn, 1909; Einzig, 1937). The most impressive
aspect of the 1907 crisis is its “textbook” TZT character (Figure 2).
Figure 2 about here
Section II. Back to basics: Target Zone Theory Revisited
Target Zone Theory (TZT) discusses the effect of monetary arrangements on the determination
of the exchange rate in a dynamic forward-looking framework. Although initially developed in the
context of Cagan’s monetary model,4 the framework is consistent with a variety of theories of
exchange rate determination. The only critical assumption (denoted H1) is that agents are rational so
that the expected exchange rate is the mathematical expectation of future exchange rate changes (for
simplicity, risk aversion in not considered). Then:
 e = Y k,E de[ ] / dt( ) (1)
In continuous time with e the exchange rate, E[de]/dt the expectation of instantaneous changes in
the exchange rate, and k a function of the “fundamentals” (the money supply, velocity, tastes,
productivity, relative prices, etc.). A linear version of equation (1) is:
e = k + gE de[ ] / dt (2)
                                                
4 Assumptions required to achieve this are PPP, UIP and a Cagan money demand function.
8Consider now that monetary authorities set a symmetrical exchange rate band – or “target” –
defined as [-c; +c]. They let the exchange rate float “freely” when it is within the band but intervene
when the exchange rate hits the boundaries. “Intervention” means adjusting k: for instance, adjusting
the money supply.5 Therefore, fundamentals are prevented from leaving a pre-assigned,
symmetrical band (given the assumed symmetry of the problem): kŒ[-h; +h], with h being a
parameter to be determined.
The second assumption of TZT (H2) is that the policy described above is credible. Monetary
authorities can persuade market participants that they are committed to the currency band. If
markets are efficient, this hypothesis implies that the forward exchange rate (a predictor of the
future exchange rate) is always found within the fluctuation band [-c; +c]. H1 and H2 also imply that
mean reversion is built into the process for the exchange rate. Rational agents expect the exchange
rate to appreciate when the exchange rate is depreciated, and to depreciate when it is appreciated.
The result is a downward sloping relation between the location of the exchange rate within the band
and the expected rate of currency depreciation (i.e. the forward premium j = E de[ ] / dt ).
An explicit illustration of this can be derived in the simplest case when fundamentals follow a
continuous time random walk. The random walk is augmented by the marginal interventions on
fundamentals that prevent the exchange rate from leaving the band:
dk = s dz + dL - dU (3)
Where sdz is the so-called “diffusion” in a Brownian motion process, and dL (resp. dU) is the
infinitesimal adjustment of fundamentals that authorities implement when k reaches its lower (resp.
                                                
5 This is the conventional interpretation of the way monetary authorities modify the money supply to prevent the
exchange rate from leaving the band (i.e. non-sterilized foreign exchange market intervention).
9upper) bound. Combining the previous equations, and setting m = 2 / gs 2  gives the general
solution, where A is a parameter that is solved using “boundary conditions”:6
e = k + A ⋅ ek ⋅m - e-k ⋅m( ) (4)
j =
A
g
⋅ ek ⋅m - e-k ⋅m( ) (5)
Using equations 4 and 5, it is possible, for a given k and set of parameters, to derive numerically
the implicit (negative) relationship between e and f.
Figure 3 about here
However, this testable implication of TZT is not the one usually considered in the literature.
Previous researchers have focused on an alternative relation requiring a third hypothesis (H3):
Covered Interest Parity (CIP) requires that interest rate differentials are identical to the forward
premium (otherwise an arbitrage is feasible). If i is the interest rate in Vienna, and i* the rate in
Berlin:
i - i* = E de[ ] / dt = j (6)
Combined with H1 and H2, H3 implies that one should expect a negative correlation between the
exchange rate and the interest rate differential. Equation (6) is just the same relation as depicted in
Figure 3, where the expected rate of depreciation has been replaced by the interest differential. This
very prediction has been tested and rejected in numerous contemporary studies (Svensson 1991,
Flood, Mathieson and Rose 1991, Lindberg and Söderlind, 1991), and researchers now doubt the
relevance of the simplest version of TZT.
The rationale for this more demanding test is questionable. Initial presentations of TZT placed
much emphasis on the monetary model of exchange rate determination and this motivated CIP. Yet,
                                                
6 The derivative of the exchange rate when fundamentals reach their upper bound h is zero, while the exchange rate is c.
10
the validity of this model is disputed (Meese and Rogoff 1984). Moreover, this section has shown
that assuming CIP is not essential for the key TZT result.
Section III. Nested Hypotheses: Tests and Results
The tests in this section rely on a new database collected from primary sources. The database is
unique because evidence on 19th century forward markets is sparse.7
a) Hypothesis H1: strong form efficiency
Fama (1984) argues that if foreign exchange markets are (strongly) efficient, the forward premium
should be an unbiased predictor of actual exchange rate changes: calling nt a random shock, et the log
spot rate at month t, ft the log forward rate quoted at month t for delivery at t+1:
et+1 - et = a + b ft - et( ) + n t+1 (6)
Efficiency implies b = 1 and a = 0 (if investors are risk neutral). An abundant literature has
tested this relation on contemporary data, but 19th-century forward markets have remained
unexplored.8 The entire sample spans 1876:11 to 1914:7. In line with the historical discussion, the
period under study is divided into three sub periods: floating exchange rates before March 1896, the
“transition” between April 1896 and July 1901, and the “currency band” after August 1901. To be
comprehensive, a number of sub-periods in the first epoch, motivated by policy/institutional
changes emphasized in Section I, are also considered.
Table 2 about here
The results of regressions 1 and 2, corresponding to the period before 1901, resemble those
obtained in literally hundreds of other studies of market efficiency (MacDonald 1988): low t-
                                                
7 Exchange rate data were collected from the Wiener Börsekammer Coursblätter, in the archive of the Wiener Börse
A.G., Strauchgasse 1-3, A-1014 Vienna, Austria. The data as well as information on early forward markets can be
found online under: Early forward exchange markets: Vienna 1876-1914 at http://www.eh.net/databases/dsonline.php.
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statistics, occasionally negative b’s, and negligible R2s (Table 2). Strictly speaking, market efficiency
is not always rejected for the period before 1901 but this comes from the low explanatory power of
the regressions (lines 1, 1a, 1b). In other cases, efficiency is clearly rejected (lines 1c and 2). Before
1901 foreign exchange markets were not efficient.
During the interval 1901 through 1914 however, results are markedly different. In fact, they
become a textbook illustration of a successful efficient markets test. The slope coefficient estimate is
.99, its standard error is small, and the constant is zero. Residuals are also well behaved, and the
predictive power of the forward premium is more important than in the other regressions (adjusted
R2=0.14). The F-test leads to accept the MEH at 5%. In sum, during the heyday of the Austro-
Hungarian currency band, exchange market efficiency did hold. This conclusion is striking in itself,
because there are few such results in the contemporary literature (De Grauwe, 1996).
a) Hypothesis H2: Credibility
The simplest test of credibility in a fluctuation band is known as Svensson’s “100% credibility
test”. As explained in Section II, if markets are strongly efficient, the forward rate is a predictor of
the future exchange rate. Consistently, it must lie within the currency band – or else, this would
denote that the band is not credible. The result of the test using the [-.5%,+5%] interval is reported
in Figure 4. It is evident that “violations” were rare, practically nonexistent after 1901. In other
words, future trades factored in the fact that monetary authorities would take action to prevent
continued departure from the currency band. The conclusion is that after 1901, the currency band
was fully credible. (For further tests see Flandreau and Komlos 2002 and Jobst 2001).
Figure 4 about here
b) H1 and H2: the exchange rate and the expected rate of depreciation
                                                                                                                                                                 
8 The only related study is Koppl and Yeager (1996) who focus on inefficiencies in the ruble/mark forward market in the
12
With efficiency and credibility holding between 1901 and 1914, one would expect that there
should be a negative relationship between the exchange rate and the (annualized) expected rate of
depreciation (F=f x 12 months 100 per cent). The test is depicted in Figure 5. Observations from
1896-1901 are represented by a circle, and observations from 1901-1914 with a dark dot. A fitted
(linear) slope is included for the latter period. The result is striking: after 1901, there is a significant,
negative relationship. This finding is the only instance of such a clear pattern reported in the target
zone literature.
Figure 5 about here
c) Bonus: fitting Krugman’s model.
The non-linear relation in Figure 3 is now adjusted to the data in Figure 5. Two implicit functions
are defined: e
g ,s 2
-1 and j
g ,s 2
-1 parameterized with g and s2, the model’s only exogenous parameters (this
can be done because the functions are strictly monotonous):
j i = jg ,s 2 (ki ) fi ki = jg ,s 2
-1 (j i )
ei = eg ,s 2 (ki ) fi ki = eg ,s 2
-1 (ei )
Ï
Ì
Ô
ÓÔ
(7)
Solving (7) gives the theoretical relation between the (monthly) forward premium and the
exchange rate. Therefore,
jˆ i = jg ,s 2 (eg ,s 2
-1 (ei ))
eˆi = eg ,s 2 (jg ,s 2
-1 (j i ))
Ï
Ì
Ô
ÓÔ
(8)
where jˆ i  is the fitted forward premium and eˆ the fitted exchange rate.
                                                                                                                                                                 
1890s. An illustration of weak form tests of market efficiency in historical context is Goldman (2000). Weak form tests
consider whether in et=r.et-1+et, r=1.
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Assuming that residuals are Gaussian, the problem is to find g and s2 that minimize the squared
residuals. There are two alternative objective functions to minimize depending on which relation is
considered, j i  as a function of ei  or ei  as a function of j i :
(j i - jˆ i
i
Â )2 = (j i - jg ,s 2 (eg ,s 2-1 (ei
i
Â ))2
(ei - eˆi
i
Â )2 = (ei - eg ,s 2 (jg ,s 2-1 (j i
i
Â ))2
Ï
Ì
Ô
Ó
Ô
(9)
Exploiting properties of the problem brings about swift convergence. Fitting j i  as a function of
ei  gives g= 30,121 and s2=0.66 (pseudo-R2 = 0.64). Fitting ei  as a function of j i  gives g= 0.49 and
s2= 0.02 (pseudo-R2 = 0.78).9 The difference between these alternative estimates is considerable
despite an overall good fit in both cases (Figure 6). The estimates should therefore be thought of as
boundaries for the “true” parameter values. This inference is also suggested by reference to
“plausible” parameters that do lie between these bounds.10
Figure 6 about here.
Section IV. Does Target Zone Theory need Covered Interest Parity?
a) CIP and TZT
CIP has received much attention in TZT literature, although, as argued above, using this
assumption is highly questionable. Evidence on its validity can be obtained by running straight tests
of the basic prediction of the model when H3 is assumed, i.e. projecting interest differentials on
exchange rates. Results are report in the first part (section 1) of Table 3. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
                                                
9 A useful property of the problem is that optimal g is a function of m ( = 2 /(gs 2 ) ) so that the minimization problem
boils down to minimization in terms of m only. We thank Anton Granik for pointing this out to us and for solving it
using MatLab. See details in technical appendix on Flandreau’s website: available on
www.financesinternationales.sciences-po.fr  .
10 The monthly volatility of fundamentals (s2) can be calibrated for the pre-target zone period. Given equation (2), the
process the exchange rate must be identical to the process for fundamentals. This gives for instance 0.11 for the period
preceding the adoption of the target zone (1892-1896). g may be inferred from estimates of  interest rate semi-elasticity
in money demand empirical studies. Knell and Stix (2004) report values around 0.1 for annual interest rates expressed
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they are similar to those reported in related work (Bordo and MacDonald 2003; 2005, Hallwood,
MacDonald and Marsh 1997; 2000). Specifically, the sign of the relation between interest
differential and the exchange rate is negative but it is only marginally significant (non significant for
market rates, and barely significant for bank rates). This is in striking contrast with the strong
significance of the relation in Figure  5. This result shows the superiority of working with forward
premia.
Table 3 about here
b) Testing for Covered Interest Parity
To highlight the importance of this result, we now test for CIP. To begin, we rely on a procedure
suggested by MacDonald (1988). It consists in projecting the (annualized) forward premium on the
interest differential, while allowing for autocorrelation of residuals. Formally:
ft - et( ) ⋅1200 = a + b ⋅ it - it *( ) +et
et = r ⋅et -1 +ht
Ï
Ì
ÓÔ (6)
CIP implies a=0 and b=1. As shown in section 2 of Table 3, this assumption is rejected at
conventional levels. However, regression analysis is not the best way to estimate CIP: CIP rests on
an arbitrage argument but arbitrage entails costs. An alternative strategy is advocated by Frenkel and
Levich (1975). It seeks to derive a zero profit condition from first principles. Consider a banker who
performs CIP arbitrage between Berlin and Vienna (such operations were routine : Einzig  1937, p.
332). The banker can lend or borrow in either market at the prevailing rates. Suppose CIP does not
hold: say, Berlin interest rates are too high. An arbitrage is to borrow florins for one month in
Vienna, sell the proceeds spot, then lend in Berlin for one month while covering the operation
through a forward contract. The operation implies one spot purchase and one forward sale: the
                                                                                                                                                                 
in percentage (5 for 0.05 or 5%). Given that our interest rates are in decimals and are monthly, this means that g should
hang around 120 (=0.1x100x12). Clearly 0.02<0.11<0.66 and 0.49<120<30,121.
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banker ends up paying the bid-ask spread. Thus, the transaction costs amount to a 0.1 florin charge
or, about 0.166% of the value of the transaction (since the exchange rate fluctuated around fl. 60),
and is in line with modern standards. The result is an interest loss of about 2% per annum (0.166%
times 12 months). Formally:
-2% £ ft - et( ) ⋅1200 - it - it*( ) £ +2%  (7)
The test is to compare the spread between interest differentials and the annualized expected rate
of depreciation, to the “neutral band” [-2%,+2%]. Figure 7 shows few violations before 1896, and
virtually none thereafter. After that date, deviations from CIP (zero line) are also found in a much
narrower range and they were short lived. From this respect, CIP can be said to have prevailed after
1896.
Therefore, while CIP did hold, and the most basic version of the TZT applied after 1901,
standard TZT tests that have been extensively applied in the literature (i.e. regression of interest
differentials against exchange rates) may nurture undue reservations towards TZT theory. This
result, simple as it is, is therefore of considerable importance.
Figure 7 about here.
c) Policy autonomy in target zones: an alternative approach
The intuition for the previous finding on the effect of arbitrage expenses on testable implications
of TZT is the familiar principle of “Tobin Taxes”: transaction costs on interest rate arbitrage have
dramatic effects over a short horizon. It remains to be shown, though, that such “frictions” don’t
have any impact on the stability-autonomy trade-off.11 To prove it, a final test is provided.
To begin, recall the earlier discussion of the 1907 episode. Monetary authorities in Vienna
decided to resist interest rate hikes implemented in Germany. In the following days, the exchange
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rates (spot and forward) depreciated above parity. Since the forward rate depreciated less than the
spot rate, the forward premium decreased and in effect became negative, just as the interest spread
with Berlin rates set by Austro-Hungarian authorities: the point is that, because of transaction
costs, “autonomous” changes in the interest rate spread caused delayed adjustments of the expected
rate of depreciation, rather than instantaneous ones.
The natural test of policy autonomy is therefore to explore Granger causality between interest
differentials and the expected rate of depreciation. Suppose that monetary authorities are able to set
the interest rate in the way conventionally described in TZT. For instance, they wish to keep
domestic rates lower than foreign ones. They will therefore set a negative interest differential, but
since there are transaction costs, this will not immediately translate into a negative forward
premium. However, after some lags adjustment will occur. In other words, policy autonomy implies
that (i-i*) should Granger cause ((f-e)1200) but not the other way round.
The third part of Table 3 reports tests of this proposition derived from a 4-lags VAR system.
Results are clear-cut. For the period of the heyday of the Austro-Hungarian currency band after
1901 there is strong evidence of a one-way causality going from interest rate differentials to the
expected rate of depreciation. This finding is in contrast to the period prior to 1896, when Granger
causality values are not significant in either direction. The conclusion therefore is that despite having
stabilized their currency within a narrow band, authorities could deviate from the interest rate set
abroad and induce the foreign exchange market adjust, following the lines of a textbook that was still
to be written.
Conclusion
                                                                                                                                                                 
11 Note that the literature on speculative attacks has emphasized that such frictions actually increase policy autonomy
(Jeanne 1996).
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Modern target zone theory has been reassessed in light of a historical precedent. Contrary to
recent experiments, the Austro-Hungarian currency band between 1901 and 1914 is a
straightforward illustration of the theory: market efficiency and a credible band are the two crucial
ingredients for the basic TZT result to obtain. This conclusion is encapsulated in Figure 6, where the
basic model is fitted, providing the first available evidence for its famous non-linearity. Another
lesson is that the modern emphasis on the monetary model for exchange rate determination and
covered interest parity has been probably misplaced. Because interest arbitrage typically entails
costs, a proper measure of policy autonomy is the extent to which monetary authorities can set the
interest rate and induce the foreign exchange market to adjust. This consideration is captured by a
Granger causality test showing that interest differentials drove the expected rate of currency
depreciation.
At a broader level, the Austro-Hungarian experience also conveys an important message. Some
economists have worried that currency depreciation fuels speculation, calling for violent interest rate
hikes. Another view, conventionally associated with the seminal study of Haberler (1949) –
incidentally a student of von Mises – is that currency depreciation triggers stabilizing speculation:
as the currency depreciates, domestic interest rates actually decline with respect to foreign ones.
The above results have given us a sense of what is necessary for this policy to work. Announcing a
target (rather than a formal band) and credibly committing to it could help a lot. But it should be
equally clear that the success of the Austro-Hungarian target zones owes a lot to the efficiency of
the foreign exchange markets of the time. At the end of this paper, one cannot help thinking that the
real curse of modern financial markets is their inefficiency – and wondering whether “modern”
theory is really modern.
18
References
Austrian National Bank Archive, Protokollen, 1907, No. 3612/15, 3849/15, 4207/15 (Vienna).
Bordo, M.D. and R. MacDonald, 2003, “The inter-war gold exchange standard: credibility and
monetary independence”, Journal of International Money and Finance 1, 1-32.
Bordo, M.D. and R. MacDonald, 2005, Violations of the rule of the game and the credibility of
the classical gold standard, 1880-1914, Journal of Monetary Economics, April.
Celli, G., 1998, Le determinanti del Tasso di sconto della Banca Centrale dell’Imperoi Austro-
Ungarico durante il Gold Standard (1876-1913): un’ analisi econometria, Master’s Dissertation,
University of Brescia.
De Grauwe, P, 1996, International money: postwar trends and theories, 2nd ed., Oxford
University Press.
Einzig, P., 1937, The Theory of Forward Exchange, Macmillan (London).
Fama, E. F., 1984, Forward and Spot Exchange Rates, Journal of Monetary Economics 3, 319-
338.
Federn, W., 1909, Die Barzahlungen, Der Österreichische Volkswirt, 17 Juli, p. 3.
Federn, W., 1910, Die Frage der Barzahlungen, Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und
Verwaltung 19, 657-678.
Federn, W., 1911, Moderne Geldtheorie im östereichisch-ungarischen Bankprivilegium,
Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft 35, 1379-1398.
Federn, W., 1912,  Entgegnung auf den Artikel von Dr. v. Mises, Das vierte Privilegium der
Österreichisch-Ungarischen Bank, Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung 21,
748-752.
Flandreau, M., 2005, The logic of compromise, CEPR discussion paper.
Flandreau, M. and J. Komlos, 2002, Core or Periphery? The Credibility of the Austro-Hungarian
Currency, 1867-1913, Journal of European Economic History, 31 (2) (Fall): 293-320.
Flood, R., A. Mathieson, and A. Rose, 1991, An Empirical Exploration of Exchange-Rate Target-
Zones, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 35, 7-66.
Frenkel J. A., and R. M. Levich, 1975, Covered Interest Arbitrage: Unexplited Profits?, Journal
of Political Economy 2, 325-338.
19
Goldman, E., 2000, Testing the efficient market hypothesis for the dollar sterling gold exchange
standard 1890-1906: MLE with double truncation, Economics Letters 69, 253-59.
Haberler, G., 1949, The Market For Foreign Exchange and the Stability of the Balance of
Payments: A Theoretical Analysis, III, Kyklos, 193-218.
Hallwood, C. P., R. MacDonald, R. and I. Marsch, 1997, Credibility and the Fundamentals:
Were the Classical and Interwar Gold Standard Well Behaved Target Zones?, in: T.A. Bayoumi, B.J.
Eichengreen, and A.J. Taylor, eds., Modern Perspectives on the Gold Standard (Cambridge
Univesity Press, Cambridge), 129-161.
Hallwood, C.P., R. MacDonald, and I. Marsch, 2000, Realignment expectations and the US
Dollar 1890-1897: was there a peso Problem?, Journal of Monetary Economics 3, 605-620.
Hodgson, G.M., 2001, How economics forgot history. The problem of historical specificity in
social sciences (Routledge: London and New York).
Jeanne, O., 1996, Would a Tobin Tax have saved the EMS?, Scandinavian Journal of Economics
4, 503-520.
Jobst, C., 2001, How to join the gold club: the credibility of Austria-Hungary’s commitment to
the gold standard 1892-1913, Unpublished Master’s dissertation, University of Vienna.
Keynes, J.M., 1930, A Treatise on Money (London, Macmillan).
Knapp, G.F., 1905, Staatliche Theorie des Geldes (Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig).
Knell, M. and H. Stix, 2004, “Three decades of money demand studies. Some differences and
remarkable similarities”, OeNB Working Paper N° 88.
Koppl, R. and L.B. Yeager, 1996, Big Players and Herding in Asset Markets: The Case of the
Russian Ruble, Explorations in Economic History 33, 367-83.
Kövér, G., and A. Pogány, 2002, Die binationale Bank einer multinationalen Monarchie : Die
Österreichisch-Ungarische Bank 1878-1922, Steiner, Stuttgart.
Krugman, P., 1991, Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics, Quarterly Journal of Economics
106, 669-82.
Lindberg, H. and P. Söderlind, 1994, Testing the Basic Target Zone Model on Swedish Data
1982-1990, European Economic Review 38, 1441-1469.
Lotz, W., 1889, Die Währungsfrage in Österreich-Ungarn und ihre wirtschaftliche und politische
Bedeutung, Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich 13,
1265-1303.
20
MacDonald, R., 1988, Floating Exchange Rates: Theory and Evidence (Unwin, London).
Meese, R and K. Rogoff, 1984, Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies: Do they fit
out of a sample ?, Journal of International Economics 14, 13-24.
Svensson, L.E.O., 1991, The Term Structure of Interest Rate Differentials in a Target Zone:
Theory and Swedish Data, Journal of Monetary Economics 28, 87-116.
Svensson, L.E.O., 1992, An Interpretation of Recent Research on Exchange Rate Target Zones
Journal of Economic Perspectives 6, 119-144.
Svensson, L.E.O., 1994, Why Exchange Rate Bands? Monetary Independence in Spite of Fixed
Exchange Rates, Journal of Monetary Economics 33, 157-199.
Von Mises, L., 1909a, The foreign exchange policy of the Austro-Hungarian bank, The Economic
Journal 19, 201-211.
Von Mises, L., 1909b, Das Problem gesetzlicher Aufnahme der Barzahlungen in Österreich-
Ungarn, Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft 33, 985-1037.
Yeager, L.B., 1969, Fluctuating Exchange Rates in the Nineteenth Century: The Experience of
Austria and Russia, in: R. Mundell and A. Swoboda, eds., Monetary Problems of the International
Economy (University of Chicago Press, Chicago), 61-89.
21
Table 1. Frequency of official discount rate changes
Country Number of Official
Discount Rate Changes
Average Number of
Changes per Annum
United Kingdom 1876-1913 221 6.70
Germany 1876-1913 136 4.12
Austria-Hungary 1876-1913 50 1.32
1876-1895 23 1.15
1896-1913 27 1.50
Source: Celli (1998).
Table 2. Foreign Exchange Market Efficiency Tests : et+1 - st = a + b ft - et( ) + n t+1
Period a b Adj.R2 DW F test
1) 1876 :12 - 1896 :3
N=232 (a)
-0.26*10-3
(-0.42)
0.54
(0.89)
-0.8*10-
3
1.99 F(2,230)=0.46 (*)
     1a) 1876:12 - 1889:7
N= 152 (a)
-0.000
(-.144)
1.47
(1.45)
.01 2.0 F(2,150)=0.13 (*)
1b) 1889 :8 - 1892 :4
N= 33
-.001
(-.43)
1.42
(.68)
-.02 1.9 F(2,31)=0.096 (*)
1c) 1892 :5 - 1896 :3
N=47
.001
(1.4)
-1.13
(-1.63)
.03 1.8 F(2,45)=5.04
2) 1896 :4 to 1901 :7
N= 64
-.000
(-.52)
.10
(.32)
-.01 2.3 F(2,219)=3.52
3) 1901 :8 to 1914 : 8
N= 157
.000
(.15)
.99
(5.23)
.14 2.0 F(2, 155)=0.01  (*)
Source: see text. t-statistics in parentheses. Regressions are based on bid prices except those marked with (a) which
are based on the bid-ask average. A star (*) means that the null that a= 0 and b=1 is accepted at 5%. Breakdowns are
July-August of 1889 (opening on debate on currency stabilization), and April-May 1892 (new parity leaked to general
public).
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Table 3. Covered Interest Parity: Explorations
Period Market Rates Bank Rates
Section 1. “Conventional” TZT test: it - it
* = a + b ⋅ et +et . H0= b≠0
1901:8-1914:7 a=0.39 (7.98)    Adj-R2=0.006
b=-0.29 (-1.41)   REJECT
a=-0.23 (-4.68)     Adj-R2=0.02
b=-0.43 (-2.08)    ACCEPT
Section 2. “Conventional” CIP test: 
ft - st( ) ⋅1200 = a + b ⋅ it - it *( ) +et
et = r ⋅et -1 +ht
Ï
Ì
ÓÔ  
H0 : b=1, a=0
1901:8-1914:7 a=-0.11 (-2.07) b=0.44 6.48) r=0.19 (2.33)
Adj-R2=0.27 F-Test=59.1 [0.0] REJECT
a=0.14 (2.59) b=0.35 (4.39) r=0.24 (3.05)
Adj-R2=0.19 F-Test=48.76 [0.0] REJECT
Section 3. Causality tests:
a) H0: ft - et( ) ⋅1200  causes it - it*( ) ?
1876:11-1896:3 1.19 [0.11]
REJECT
1.02 [0.39]
REJECT
1901:8-1914:7 0.27 [0.89]
REJECT
0.22 [0.92]
REJECT
b) H0: it - it*( )  causes ft - et( ) ⋅1200 !?
1876:11-1896:3 1.36 [0.24]
REJECT
0.66 [0.61]
REJECT
1901:8-1914:7 5.14 [0.0006]
ACCEPT
3.65 [0.007]
ACCEPT
Source: see text. T-Stats in parentheses (), probabilities in brackets, significance assessed at 5%
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